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Abstract  
The  past  decade  has  seen  an  increase  in  the  extent  of  research  focused  on  low-­cost  
innovation  in  emerging  and  transition  countries  (ETC).  However  most  studies  focus  on  
defining  and  differentiating  the  various  innovation  terminologies  (good-­enough,  frugal,  
cost  etc.)  and   in  general  offer  a  market  based  view  of  how   firms  develop   low-­cost  
innovations   in   response   to   consumer   needs   and   affordability   constraints   (demand  
side),  rather  than  attempting  to  understand  ‘how’  firms  may  also  come  to  develop  such  
innovation   capabilities   as   a   result   of   institutional   factors   related   to   public-­science  
system,   labour   and   finance   (supply   side).   The   analysis   in   this   paper   is   structured  
around  low-­cost  innovation  in  rechargeable  batteries  in  China  and  point-­of-­use  water  
purification  in  India,  and  draws  upon  strategies  at  the  Chinese  firm  BYD  and  Indian  
firm  Tata   respectively.  Our  analysis  shows   that  a.)   Institutional  structuring  of  public  
science   R&D   and   weak   engagement   with   industry,   b.)   ‘diffusion   oriented   policies’  
related  to  producing  technical  labour,  and  c.)  a  weak  venture  capital  finance  system,  
are  important  drivers  for  firms  in  ETCs  to  focus  on  low-­cost  technological  innovation  
capabilities.    






1.   Introduction  
Management  researchers  have  devoted  considerable  attention  to  the  drivers  of  new  
product   innovation  and   its   impact  on   firm  performance   (Chesbrough,  1999;;  Teece,  
1986;;  Tylecote  &  Ramirez,  2006).  However  research  on  innovation  capabilities  and  
strategies   is   largely   based   on   the   institutional   structures   of   the   developed   west.  
Considerably  less  attention  has  been  devoted  to  the  study  of  innovation  in  Emerging  
and  Transition  Countries  (ETCs)  (Crescenzi,  et  al.,  2012;;  Ayyagari,  et  al.,  2011).  This  
is  despite  the  fact  that  competitiveness  of  firms  and  regions  in  a  globalizing  economy  
rests   on   their   ability   to   continuously   develop,   accumulate   and   exploit   transnational  
capabilities  (Ghoshal  &  Bartlett,  1988;;  Cooke  &  Morgan,  1998).  
The  majority  of  Customers  in  ETCs  are  very  price  sensitive  and  have  very  different  
requirements   to  developed  countries   in   terms  of  product  and  service   requirements.  
Developing   low-­cost   and   good-­enough   innovation   requires   different   strategies   to  
premium  products  for  western  markets.    Williamson   (2010)   introduced   the   idea   of  
‘Cost  innovation’  as  solutions  that  offer  similar  functionalities  to  Western  products  at  
lower   cost.   An   often   cited   example   of   cost   innovation   is   rechargeable   lithium-­ion  
batteries  made  by   the  Chinese   firm  BYD  which  was  able   to   reduce   the  production  
costs  by  70%  by  using  a  semi-­automated  process  (Quan  &  Sanderson,  2013).  Another  
popular  concept  is  ‘Frugal  Innovation’  (Radjou,  et  al.,  2012;;  Bound  &  Thornton,  2012),  
which   is   not   a   re-­engineered   solution   like   BYDs   semi-­automated   process,   but   a  
product  or  service  that  may  be  quite  disruptive  because  firms  offering  them  are  not  
competing  merely  against  a  traditional  rival  but  also  against  “non-­consumption”  since  
the  potential  customer  might  not  have  the  financial  means  or  access  to  the  necessary  
infrastructure   for  using   it.   Indian   firm  Tata’s   ‘Swach’  water  purifier   that  can   remove  
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99%  of   disease   causing  bacteria   is   often   cited  as  an  example  of   frugal   innovation  
(Tiwari  &  Herstatt,  2012).  It  was  offered  at  a  price  point  keeping  in  mind  the  affordability  
constraints   of   the   ‘bottom   of   the   pyramid’   income   group.   A   fuse   on   the   product  
indicated  beforehand  to  the  consumer  when  the  filter  was  near  its    end  of  life,  giving  
enough  time  to  replace  the  filter,  hence  solving  the  accessibility  constraint.  
Despite   the   increasing   attention   on   low-­cost   innovation   in   ETCs   (Prahalad,   2006;;    
Zeng  &  Williamson,  2007;;  Brown  &  Hegel,  2005;;  Govindarajan  &  Ramamurti,  2011;;  
Radjou,  et  al.,  2012;;  Prahalad  &  Mashelkar,  2010),  the  existing  literature  is  weak  on  
the  institutional  antecedents  of  low-­cost  innovation.  Most  studies  focus  on  the  demand  
side  in  relation  to  customer  affordability  and  accessibility.    Ernst,  et  al.  (2015)  claim  to  
draw  on  institutional  theory  to  explain  three  antecedents  of  affordable  value  innovation  
-­bricolage   (creative   combination   of   scarce   existing   resources   to   develop   new  
solutions),   local-­embeddedness   of   a   firm   and   product   standardization.   Their   study  
however   tends   towards  pragmatism  as   it  explains  how   firms  overcome   institutional  
constraints   rather   than  understanding  how   the  structure  of   institutions   in   itself  may  
encourage  firms  to  develop  distinctive  low-­cost  innovation  capabilities.  We  argue  that  
such  a  market-­led  approach  on  low-­cost  innovation  puts  a  strong  emphasis  upon  the  
need   for   ‘quick’   adjustments   in   reaction   to   an   uncertain   environment,   rather   than  
improving   the  efficiency  of   institutions.  This   research   therefore  emphasises   the  key  
features  of  institutions  that  shape  low-­cost  innovation  competencies.  
This  research  will  primarily  look  at  technology  oriented  innovation  because  technology  
development  has  a  strong  impact  on  national  innovation  policies.  Most  of  the  scientific  
and   technical   knowledge   still   exists   in   the   triad   countries   (United   States,  Western  
Europe  and  Japan)  and  technology  development  in  ETC’s  continues  to  rely  on  transfer  
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of  knowledge  and  expertise  from  the  industrially  advanced  economies,  moreover  it  is  
often  inappropriate  to  the  needs  of  low  income  consumers  (Kaplinsky,  et  al.,  2009).    
Archibugi  and  Pietrobelli  (2003)  also  argue  that  the  transfer  of  foreign  technology  per  
se  has  a  negligible  impact  on  learning  unless  accompanied  by  local  innovation  policies  
to  promote  learning,  skills  and  technological  capabilities.    Therefore  this  study  aims  to  
analyse  the  relevance  of  technology  innovation  within  the  socio-­economic  condition  it  
is   embedded   in,   because   policies   that   are   only   aimed   at   catching   up   with   the  
developed  west  are  unlikely  to  meet  the  needs  of  most  people  in  ETC’s.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  In  section  2,  we  discuss  the  theoretical  
and  empirical  background  of   the  study.  The  methodological   issues  related   to  using  
archival  data  are  presented  in  section  3.  In  section  4,  we  provide  a  detailed  analysis  
of   low   cost   innovation   in   rechargeable   batteries   in   China   and   point-­of-­use   water  
purification  in  India.  Our  analysis  will  draw  upon  firm-­level  strategies  at  BYD  in  China  
and  Tata  in  India.  In  section  5,  we  conclude  that  the  structuring  of  institutions  plays  a  
critical  role  in  ETC  firms  innovation  strategies,  and  offer  thoughts  for  future  research  
on  sectoral  innovation  across  countries.  
2.     Institutions  and  Innovation  Capabilities  
The  potential  market  size  of  ETCs  has  attracted  management  scholars  and  thinkers  
to  investigate  and  analyse  their  role  in  globalization  of  technology  and  innovation.  Ever  
since  Vernon  (1966)  first  proposed  the  product  life-­cycle  theory,  industrially  advanced  
countries  have  been  the  focus  of  innovation  diffusion  studies.  According  to  this  classic  
notion,  new  products  and  technologies  are  first  developed  and  launched  in  developed  
countries,  and  only  later  introduced  and  commercialized  in  less  developed  countries  
when   they   have   become   increasingly   mature,   out-­of-­date,   and   obsolete   in   the  
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developed  market.    
The   large  market  potential  of  ETCs  has   led   to   increasing  competition  among   firms  
fighting   for   a   share   of   the   pie   (Iyer,   et   al.,   2006;;  Gadiesh,   et   al.,   2007).  However,  
despite   a   growing  middle   class   in   ETC’s,   especially   in   Asia,   most   consumers   still  
cannot  afford  western  consumption  and  are  often  constrained  by  other  bottlenecks,  
such  as  poor  public  and  private  infrastructure  or  limited  service  availability.  As  a  result,  
firms  have  started  to  develop  market-­specific  local  innovations  that  are  characterized  
by  high  value  at  low  cost,  and  potentially  disruptive.  The  rising  demand  for  low–cost  
products   among   the   aspiring   consumers   of   the   developing   world   will   drive   an  
enormous  global  market  for  low–cost,  high–quality  products.    
The  emergence  of  a  hub  for  low-­cost  innovations  possibly  suggests  a  “lead  market”  
role   for   ETC’s   (Tiwari   &   Herstatt,   2012;;   Herstatt   &   Tiwari,   2017).   However,   lead  
markets,  as  understood  today,  are  associated  with  economically  developed  countries  
characterized   by   high   per   capita   income,   great   customer   sophistication   and   high  
quality  infrastructure.  Tiwari  and  Herstatt  (2012)  propose  that  lead  markets  can  also  
emerge   in  ETC’s  because  market  attractiveness   (e.g.  high  demand  volume,  export  
advantage)   and   technological   capabilities   can   offset   many   other   resource   and  
institutional  constraints.  The  generally  low  customer  sophistication  is  thus  balanced  by  
innovator   sophistication   to   design   cost   effective,   “good   enough”   solutions   that   can  
meet   the  needs  and  aspirations  of  consumers   in  a  highly  competitive  market.  This  
implies   that   firms  need  access   to  a  competent  and  sufficiently   large   technical  base  
with  in-­depth  knowledge  of  the  targeted  consumers  (“social  capital”).  However  Tiwari  
and  Herstatt  do  not  consider  how  the  structuring  of  institutions  may  also  lead  firms  to  
develop  low-­cost  technological  capabilities  and  unique  innovation  strategies  to  satisfy  
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the  lead  market  potential.  The  lead  market  idea  is  focused  on  competition  as  the  most  
important  element  to  push  innovation.  However  development  issues  such  as  access  
to   clean  water  at   low-­cost   cannot  be   solved  simply  by   competitive   strategies   to   fill  
institutional  voids,  because  such  solutions  require  firms  to  have  an  innovation  model  
that  supports   them  in   identifying  specific  solvable  problems  and  proposing  possible  
modes   of   participation   within   the   current   institutional   set-­up.   The   current   study  
therefore  deepens  our  understanding  of  how   institutions   in  ETCs   interact  with   firm-­
level  strategies,  and  explains  how  firms  come  to  develop  unique  low-­cost  innovation  
capabilities.    
The   idea  of   a  National   Innovation  Systems   (NIS)   is   often  used   to  understand  how  
national   institutions  contribute   to  generation  and  diffusion  of  new  technologies,  and  
how   government   and   firms   negotiate   policies   to   influence   the   innovation   process  
(Metcalfe,  1995).  The  key  components  of  innovation  systems  include  firms  of  different  
types,   public   and  private   research  organisations,   education  and   vocational   training  
institutions,   financial   institutions,   business   associations,   research   consortia   etc.  
(Whitley  (2002),  Whitley  (2007,  pg.  75)).    
Although   technological   ‘catch-­up’   and   economic   development   have   always   been  
central  to  the  NIS  concept  (Lundwall,  2007),  the  idea  was  conceived  on  institutional  
characteristics   in   developed   countries   (e.g.   Japan,   USA,   Germany,   Sweden)   with  
ETC’s   largely   absent   from   discussions   in   early   literature.   However,   later   the   NIS  
concept  was  applied  to  the  newly  industrialised  countries  of  the  east  (e.g.  South  Korea,  
Taiwan,  and  Singapore)  and  countries  of  Latin  America  (e.g.  Mexico  and  Argentina),  
and   more   recently,   been   applied   to   the   transition   countries   in   eastern   Europe,  
emerging   powers   of   India,   China,   and   South   Africa,   and   more   limitedly   to   less  
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developed  countries   in  Sub-­  Saharan  Africa  and  elsewhere  (Metcalfe  &  Ramlogan,  
2008;;  Balzat  &  Hanusch,  2004).    
Gu   (1999)   suggests   that   technology   catch-­up   with   the   west,   based   on   industrial  
models  of  the  west  and  capital  from  the  west  is  the  best  way  to  augment  the  innovation  
system   in   ETC’s.   Though   “imitation”   catch-­up   activities   may   be   considered   as  
innovations  since  their  adoption  involves  adaptations  to  the  local  context  (Dutz,  2016)  
and  may  also  positively  correlate  with  new-­technology  development  (Zhang  &  Zhou,  
2016),  ultimately  ETC’s  must  implement  an  Innovation  policy  that  is  most  appropriate  
for   their   country’s   unique   socio-­economic   structure.   While   ‘best   practices’  
implemented   in  developed  and   recently   industrialised  countries  such  as  Korea  can  
offer   useful   guidance,   a   ‘one   size   fits   all’   solution   is   unlikely   to  align  with   the   local  
context   (Crescenzi   and   Rodríguez-­Pose,   2012;;   Niosi,   2010).      However   National  
innovation  systems  may  be  weakening  as  different  countries  and  also  different  regions  
within   the   same   country   may   have   advantages   in   different   sectors,   thus   requiring  
different   logics.   Also   key   features   and   characteristics   of   institutional   frameworks  
governing   finance,   labour   and   public   science   systems   encourage   firms   to   develop  
innovative   competencies   in   different   ways,   and   so   generate   different   types   of  
technology   innovation   in   different   societies   (Whitley,   2007,   pg.   191).   Bhatti      and  
Ventresca   (2013)   argue   that,   in   addition   to   resource   constraints   faced   by   firms  
upstream   of   their   value   chain   in   order   to   innovate   and   affordability   constraints  
downstream  in  meeting  the  needs  of  the  base  of  the  pyramid,  firms  are  challenged  by  
complex   institutional   contexts   or   institutional   voids   characterised   by   the   lack   of  
institutional  facilities,  norms,  and  regulations  needed  for  a  well-­functioning  economy.  
This   is   because   of   constraints   on   the   limited   capacity   of   governments   in  ETC’s   to  
pursue   various   issues   at   a   time.      While   such   institutional   features   generally   limit  
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business  activity  by  increasing  transaction  costs  and  therefore  represent  a  hurdle  for  
MNC  and  entrepreneurs  (Soni  &  Krishnan,  2014),  they  may  encourage  development  
of  new  innovative  competencies.   Institutions  can  indeed  facilitate   innovation   if   firms  
have  an  adaptive  ability   that  allows  them  to  react   to  and  play  a  more  active  role   in  
overcoming  any  institutional  constraints  by  taking  over  certain  functions  of  institutions  
(Greeven,  2013).  Bhatti  and  Ventresca  do  not  analyse  how  key  features,  of  institutions  
can   encourage   firms   to   develop   organisational   capabilities   suitable   for   low-­cost  
innovation.  Moreover  the  development  of  specific  ways  of  innovating  depends  not  only  
on   the   strength   of   institutions,   but   also   on   the   complementarity   of   key   institutions.  
Complementarity   entails   that   the   comparative   advantage   of   a   region   or   country  
depends  upon  the  extent  to  which  institutions  are  compatible  with  one  another  (Bruno,  
2000).  For  example,  a  robust  venture  capital  market  is  dependent  upon  the  existence  
of  clear   rules  governing   intellectual  property   rights   (Fenn,  et  al.,  1995).  Because  of  
institutional  complementarity,  different  kinds  of  learning,  cooperation  and  competition  
take  place  under  different  institutional  settings  (Whitley,  2007,  pg.  84).  Therefore  both  
the  strength  of  institutions  and  extent  of  complementarity  lead  to  certain  firm  strategies  
and  organisational  forms  to  become  prevalent.    
Strategic   cost-­innovation   in   high-­tech   firms   that   is   primarily   a   result   of   efficient  
management   of   low-­cost   labour   may   not   be   perceived   as   genuine   technological  
innovation  capabilities  (Zheng  &  Wang,  2012).  Moreover  any  Innovation  is  likely  to  be  
process  innovation,  new  techniques  that  lower  production  costs.  As  we  shall  see  later  
in  the  case  of  rechargeable  batteries  made  by  BYD,  the  lower  costs  were  a  result  of  
both   low-­cost   labour   and   process   improvements.   Also   low   to   medium   technology  
innovation  for   the  bottom-­of-­pyramid,   though  market  disruptive,  could  be  a  result  of  
incremental  improvements  to  existing  technology  and  not  a  result  of  radical  technology  
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development   (Agnihotri,   2015).   In   the   case   of   Tata’s   Swach   water   purifier,   the  
technology  development  is  arguably  incremental,  as  it   involved  a  new  technique  for  
treating  an  existing  water   filter  made  of   rice  husk  ash  with  silver  nanoparticles   that  
have   antimicrobial   properties.   As   such,   Swach   did   not   involve   the   development   of  
radically   new   materials.   However   radical   technological   innovation   is   an   important  
driver  of  the  growth,  success,  and  wealth  of  firms  and  nations  (Tellis,  et  al.,  2009).  (Li,  
et  al.  (2017)  suggest  that  because  high  resource  consumption  and  high  uncertainty  
are  two  of  the  most  critical  challenges  for  radical  technological  breakthroughs,  for  firms  
in  ETCs  that  are  characterized  by  significant  resource  deficiency  and  high  contextual  
uncertainty,  it  becomes  necessary  that  they  adopt  resource  acquisition  and  resource  
accumulation   for   effectively   managing   their   resource   portfolios,   and   also   embrace    
resource  flexibility  and  coordination  flexibility  for  effectively  managing  their  contextual  
uncertainties.  However  a  resource  based  view  (RBV)  of  firm  considered  in  isolation  
from  the  institutional  environment,  specifically  the  nature  of  the  public  science  system  
and   engagement   of   firms   with   them,   cannot   fully   explain   how   firms   develop   their  
technological  capabilities  and  form  their  innovation  strategies.  Moreover  it  is  important  
to  understand  the  relevance  of  radical  innovation  in  the  context  of  the  ‘distinctive’  low-­
cost   capabilities  and   routines   in  ETC   firms.  We  argue   that   uncertainties  and   costs  
could  be  minimized  if  institutions  not  only  enable  firms  to  make  their  own  technology  
accumulation,  but  also  facilitate  access  to  radical  technologies  and  skills  in  the  public  
science  system.  
Summing  up,   the  work  on   low-­cost   innovation  has   thus   far  been  enriched  by  many  
empirical   case   studies   but   awaits   further   theoretical   analyses.   Although   several  
studies  have  attempted  to  integrate  institutional  theory  to  explain  low-­cost  innovation,  
I  believe  that  none  explain  how  firms  come  to  develop  such  ‘capabilities’.  Strategies  
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promulgated  for  developed  countries  may  not  be  appropriate  for  ETC’s  that  provide  a  
socio-­economic  context  for  how  institutions  in  transition  and  market  constraints  such  
as   affordability   and   accessibility,   provide   opportunities   for   emergence   of   new  
organisational  and  technological  capabilities.  Previous  research  has  elaborated  on  the  
‘market  based’  view  of  low-­cost  innovations  captured  in  the  various  terminologies  such  
as   ‘Good-­enough’,   ‘Trickle-­up’,   ‘Blow-­back’   innovation   etc.   (Zedtwitz,   et   al.,   2015).  
Drawing   on   an   institutional   perspective,   this   study   argues   that   low-­cost   innovation  
capabilities  are  profoundly  influenced  by  the  structuring  of  institutions.    
  
3.   Methodology    
This  research   looks  at   innovations  within  two  technological  domains:  Rechargeable  
Batteries  and  Point  of  Use  (PoU)  Water  purification,  and  draw  on  two  successful  low-­
cost   innovations   launched   in   an   ETC   context   –   BYD’s   rechargeable   Lithium-­ion  
batteries  in  China  launched  in  1995  and  Tata’s  ‘Swach’  water  purifier  launched  in  India  
in  2009.  I  compare  the  two  innovations  with  current  and  potentially  radical  technology  
developments  in    respective  countries  within  the  same  sector,  and  analyse  what  if  any  
impact  institutional  changes  have  had  on  the  nature  of  innovation  capabilities.  BYD’s  
process   innovation   in   manufacturing   Lithium-­Ion   batteries   is   compared   with  
developments  in  a  new  advanced    performance  and  potentially  low-­cost  radical  battery  
technology   namely   Sodium-­Carbon   dioxide   batteries   at   China’s   Nankai   University.  
Tatas   Swach   water   purifier   is   compared   with   more   advanced   nano-­materials  
innovation  from  Indian  Institute  of  Technology  Madras  (IITM)  capable  of  meeting  more  
complex  water  purification  challenges  at  low-­cost.    The  analysis  is  primarily  based  on  
extensive   secondary   archival   data   from   interview   quotes   in  mass  media   and   case  
studies   from   credible   sources.   Interview   quotes   in   mass   media   are   accepted   as  
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credible  only  if  they  can  be  verified  using  other  secondary  data  or  where  possible  using  
direct  interviews.  Qualitative  evidence  is  not  used  to  build  theory  but  rather  to  provide  
examples  that  reflect  various  features  and  characteristics  of  institutions  and  markets.  
  
   Type  of  Data   Period  
BYD’s  low-­cost  
innovation  on  Lithium-­
Ion  battery  production  
Interviews  with  founder  and  CEO  in  Two  Press  Articles.   2009-­
2010  
Quotes  of  founder  and  CEO  in  three  Case  Studies   2006-­
2013  
Quotes   of   various   senior   management   in   a   conference  
proceeding:  Asian   Business   &   Management   Special   Issue  
and   Conference   2016   (Interviews   in   the   article   were  
conducted  by  Chinese  media  agency  CCTV)    
2017  
Sodium-­Carbon  dioxide  
batteries  from  Nankai  
university  
Quotes  from  various  senior  government  officials  in  magazine  
Nature  Outlook  
2016  
Quotes  of  inventor  and  comment  of  another  scientific  expert  
in  magazine  Chemistry  World  
2016  
Tata  Swach  water  
Purifier  










Materials  for  water  
purification  








Quotes  of  inventor  in  magazine  Scientific  American   2013  
Direct  Interview  with  inventor  –  Prof.  T.  Pradeep   2017  
  
3.1  Rechargeable  Batteries:  “Process  Re-­engineering”  v.  “New  Materials”  
Background  
BYD  Co.  of  China  was  founded  in  1995  by  Wang  Chuanfu,  a  chemist  and  government  
scientist  to  manufacture  rechargeable  batteries,  when  the  battery  market  in  China  was  
huge,  but  dominated  by  Japanese  imports  at  very  high  prices.  By  2009,  the  company  
occupied  10%  of  global  market   share   for   lithium   ion  batteries  and  was   the  second  
largest  lithium-­ion  battery  supplier  for  mobile  phones  in  the  world  (Shirouzu,  2009).    
A  significant  competitive  advantage  of  the  company  is  its  low  cost  structure.  This  was  
achieved  by   replacing  expensive  machinery  with  a  semi-­automated   line  and  cheap  
local   labour.  The  custom-­built   semi-­automated   line  cost  a   fraction  at  US  $3  million  
compared  to  $100  million  for  a  fully  automated  line.  Since  labour  costs  were  very  low  
then  in  China,   it  helped  BYD  with  significantly   lower  overall  manufacturing  costs.  In  
1998,   BYD   could   sell   one   lithium-­ion   battery   at   US   $3,   whereas   Japanese  
manufacturers  charged  US  $8  for  a  similar  quality  battery  (Quan  &  Sanderson,  2013).  
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However  waste  rates  were  between  20  and  30%  whereas  an  automated  production  
line  in  Japan  would  have  a  waste  rate  of  about  5  %  (Dongmei,  et  al.,  2010).    BYD  still  
enjoyed  60%  gross  margin  for  each  battery.  The  R&D  strategy  of  BYD’s  case  is  more  
than  just  process  simplification  because  they  had  to  re-­design  the  entire  production  
line  based  on  the  limited  resources  they  could  leverage  (e.g.  cheap  labour).  Although  
their  production  process  is  less  sophisticated  than  their  Japanese  counterparts,  BYD  
still   had   strict   product   quality   controls   in   order   to   compete   with   their   competitors.  
Lithium-­Ion   battery   market   has   grown   exponentially   since   the   mid   1990s   (Vulcan,  
2008;;  Clark,  2016),  and  today  BYD  occupies  25%  of  the  market  share  (Lux  Research,  
2017).  
Though  Initially  BYD  had  to  depend  on  external  suppliers,  the  acquisitions  of  nearly  
200   companies   and   their   integration   into   BYD   has   allowed   it   to   focus   on   internal  
capability   development   along   the   entire   value   chain.   As   almost   two-­thirds   of   the  
engineers   working   on   battery   technology   are   dedicated   to   process   design,   the  
assembly   lines   are   also   developed   internally.   This   further   reduced   the   price   of  
batteries.    As  a  consequence,  from  delivering  initially  batteries  for  mobile  cell  phones,  
BYD  was  able  to  quickly  diversify  into  producing  many  mobile  components  for  major  
companies  like  Siemens,  Nokia  and  Motorola.  Within  a  short  span  of  time  BYD  had  
developed  strong  product   innovation  as  well  as  process  engineering  capabilities  as  
core  competences.  
Chinas  diffusion  oriented  labour  policy  and  low-­cost  ‘Process  Innovation’  
BYD’s  entry  and  gaining  a  share   from  Japanese   rivals   in  a  high  growth  market   for  
Lithium-­ion   batteries   is   normally   attributed   to   it   developing   new   low   cost   ‘process’  
innovation   capabilities.   Such   low   cost   capabilities   were  made   possible   due   to   the  
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composition  of   its   labour   institution,   i.e.  availability  of  a  huge  pool  of   low  cost-­high  
quality   labour   for  R&D   in  addition   to   low  cost  unskilled   labour   for   its  manufacturing  
operations.  Further,  BYD  efficiently  manages  its  highly  skilled  human  resources  (Quan  
&  Sanderson,  2013).  The  many  thousands  of  graduates  recruited  each  year  from  the  
best   Chinese   universities   are   systematically   trained   and   go   through   a   job   rotation  
programme.  It  was  especially  easy  to  find  good  talent  in  the  early  days  because  of  the  
lack  of  job  opportunities  for  graduates.  To  retain  good  talent,  BYD  provides  plenty  of  
promotion   opportunities   and   stock   options   as   well.   Employment   has   increased  
exponentially   since   BYD   was   founded,   from   about   20   employees   in   1995,   a   few  
hundred  in  1997,  to  little  more  than  10,000  in  year  2000,  to  more  than  150,000  today.  
Thus  BYD’s   innovation  capabilities  emerge   from  a  strategic  approach   to  managing  
and  training  its  human  capital.  Importantly,  BYD  developed  its  own  internal  R&D  and  
manufacturing  capabilities  with  little  links  into  the  public  science  system.  In  general  the  
cooperation  between  universities  and  enterprises  remains  weak  in  China  and  firms  do  
not  have  mechanisms  to  effectively  absorb  universities’  research  output  (Boeing,  et  
al.,  2016).  Zheng  (2014)  however  argues  that  the  key  factors  for  Chinese  firms  to  be  
technologically  innovative  are  more  internally  driven,  in  alignment  with  the  resource-­
based  and  competency-­based  strategic  perspective.  High  technology  Chinese  firms  
focus   heavily   on   developing   internal   assets   such   as   technology   champions,  
entrepreneurship,  organisational  structural  reform,  learning  and  knowledge  creation,  
as  well  as  building  strong  financial  base  (i.e.,  utilising  stock  market  listings  to  generate  
capital  for  growth  and  expansion).  
In   the   early   1980’s   China   was   introducing   major   institutional   and   policy   changes  
affecting  its  technological  learning  system.  During  this  time  it  was  heavily  dependent  
on  foreign  education  and  technology  transfer  (Xie  &  White,  2006).  Chinese  universities  
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focused  on  producing  engineers  and  scientists  than  on  training  them  to  do  advanced  
research,  hence  the  government  had  to  sponsor  Chinese  students  to  pursue  higher  
education   abroad,   especially   USA.   The   1990s   saw   major   policies   in   advanced  
manufacturing   and   quality   systems,   however   Chinese   firms   relied   on   MNC’s   for  
technological  know-­how.  Therefore  China’s   ‘diffusion’  oriented  policies   in  the  1980s  
and  1990s  did  not  encourage  close  long-­term  links  between  domestic  firms  and  local  
university  researchers  and  the  engagement  was  usually  limited  to  solving  short-­term  
problems.  However  the  weak  science-­industry   link  was  balanced  by  a   large  pool  of  
highly   skilled   graduates   (strong   labour   institutions)   in   enhancing   firms   capabilities,  
especially  in  particular  sectors  such  as  in  Electronics.  This  combination  of  particular  
features   of   institutional   systems   could   have   driven   BYD   to   work   closely   with  
customers,  instead  of  the  public  science  system,  to  develop  innovation  competencies  
in  low  cost-­high  quality  batteries.  For  example  during  BYDs  early  years,  Motorola  sent  
its  engineers  to  work  on-­site  and  closely  with  BYD  engineers  to  improve  the  quality  of  
its  batteries.  Six  months  later,  BYD  earned  the  six-­sigma  certification,  an  international  
badge   of   quality  Motorola   itself   invented   (Fishman,   2005,   pg.   215).      By   relying   on  
existing  technological  knowledge  around  Lithium-­ion  batteries,  and  collaborating  with  
customers   in  building   firm  specific  know-­how   in   low  cost  process   innovation  and   in  
developing  new  organisational  routines  in  quality,  BYD  was  able  to  outdo  its  Japanese  
rivals.   Thus   the   local   labour   composition   and   weak   university-­industry   interaction  
encouraged   the   integration  of  existing  know-­how  with  support   from  key  customers,  
leading  to  re-­engineering  the  production  process  from  a  largely  automated  to  a  semi-­
automated   method.   One   could   however   argue   that   a   re-­engineered   ‘process’  
innovation   strategy   would   limit   the   ability   of   BYD   to   move   into   new   technological  
domains,  as  the  innovation  is  incremental  in  nature,  rather  than  being  something  new  
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and   radical.      Interestingly   BYD   has   diversified   into   other   industry   sectors   such   as  
automotive   and   lighting,   however   its   growth   in   these   sectors   is   still   a   result   of   its  
production   capabilities   around   its   core   technological   knowledge   in   batteries.   For.  
Example,  the  DENZA  electric  car  manufactured  by  a  50:50  joint  venture  between  BYD  
and  Daimler  Mercedes  (BYD  Daimler  New  Technology  Co.,  Ltd.  or  BDNT  in  short),  
combines  Daimler’s  engineering  expertise  as  a  worldwide  leader  in  safety  technology  
and  quality  excellence  with  BYD’s  low-­cost  battery  technology.  Thus  from  venturing  
into   new   end   sectors   such   as   automobiles   and   externally   sourcing   technological  
knowledge   in   these  sectors,  BYD   in  effect   reinforced  and  augmented   its  distinctive  
capabilities  in  low-­cost  innovation    around  its  original  core  technological  domain  i.e.  
batteries.    
Can  Chinas  new  high-­tech  policy  ensure  low-­cost  ?  
Though  Chinese  firms  have  largely  followed  an  incremental  innovation  strategy  aimed  
at  reducing  costs,  the  weakening  of  such  a  strategy  due  to  competition  from  countries  
in  ASEAN,  saw  the  Chinese  government  focus  on  endogenous  innovation  in  the  last  
10   years   (Gu,   et   al.,   2016)   including   the   establishment   of   about   38   collaborative  
innovation   centres   (CICs)   across   the   country   since   2012   (McGilvray,   2016).   An  
important  potentially   radical  nano-­technology  was  a  sodium–carbon  dioxide  battery  
coming   out   of   the  CIC   in  Chemical   Science   and  Engineering   (CICCSE)   at  Nankai  
University  in  2015.  In  principle,  these  batteries  are  more  energy  efficient  than  lithium-­
ion  batteries,  as  well  as  ‘cheaper’  because  of  the  abundance  of  sodium  and  carbon  
dioxide   (Kramer,   2016).   Because   ‘diffusion   oriented’   Science   policy   that   is   closely  
linked   to   current   problems   is   unlikely   to   encourage   strong   connections   between  
industry   and   researchers   in   public   science   institutions   around   ‘pre-­competitive’  
fundamental  research  on  remote  topics  that  seeks  to  explain  general  phenomena,  one  
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would  hope  that  high  technology  research  centres   like  CICCSE  would  enhance  the  
National  Innovation  capacity  for  more  radical  research.  However  industrial  interaction  
between  CICCSE  and  industry  (Lithium  ion  Battery  developer  Lishen  and  electronics  
manufacturer   Samsung)   has   also   simultaneously   continued   in   improving   current  
technology  around  Lithium  batteries,  presumably  because   the  new  Sodium-­Carbon  
dioxide  technology  is  not  yet  commercial,  and  translating  it  into  practical  benefit  is  not  
trivial.   ‘Pre-­competitive’   research   can   result   in   radical   technologies,   however  when  
research   in   universities   and   other   public   research   organisations   is   facilitated   and  
coordinated   by   government   around   its   public   objectives   and   mission,   and   not   a  
consequence  of  strategic  R&D  investments  by  autonomous  firms  (as  was  the  case  of    
Bell   labs,   RCA,   Xerox   PARC   and   Fairchild   semiconductor   in   the   United   States),  
technology  development  will  tend  to  be  restricted  to  a  few  priority  areas  of  economic  
interest   for   the   government   rather   than   being   ‘generic’   (Whitley,   2007;;   pg.   70).  
Therefore  though  China’s  high-­tech  research,  whose  costs  are  mostly  borne  by  the  
government  as  in  the  case  of  CIC’s,  may  lead  to  newer  technologies,  however  when  
government   policy   is   focused   on   current   priority   economic   sectors   and   industrial  
engagement   is   largely   around   solving   current   problems   within   those   sectors,   the  
primary   emphasis   in   Chinese   firms   Innovation   strategy   will   be   tweaking   existing  
technologies,   and  not  much      research  effort   around  developing   “new   to   the  world”  
scientific   ideas   and   technologies   (Gupta   &  Wang,   2016;;  Williamson   &   Yin,   2014).  
Taking  the  example  of  Sodium-­Carbon  dioxide  batteries,  though  they  can  theoretically  
store  ten  times  more  charge  for  the  same  weight,  and  use  cheaper  and  more  abundant  
materials,   i.e.   Sodium   and   the   freely   available   Carbon   dioxide   in   the   air,  
commercialisation  may  be  challenging  because  it  will  be  difficult  for  firms  to  acquire  
radically  new  skills  to  scale  such  technologies  to  also  realize  low  production  costs  if  
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they   follow   a   rather   passive   approach   to   working   with   public-­science   institutes   by  
restricting  to  incremental  improvements  to  current  technologies.  Further,  in  addition  to  
recruiting  recent  graduates  emerging  from  higher  education  such  as  seen  in  the  case  
of   BYD,   firms   may   have   to   focus   on   recruiting   leading   scientists   and   highly  
experienced  researchers  who  have  spent  significant  time  in  public-­science  institutions  
even   after   their   PhDs,   in   order   to   commercialise   radical   technologies   that   carry   a  
significant  level  of  technical  and  economic  uncertainty,  especially  in  the  early  stages.  
	  
3.2  Point  of  Use  (PoU)  Water  Purification:  “Design  trade-­offs”  v.  “New  Materials”    
Background  
In   India,  access   to   improved  water  supply  and  sanitation   remains   insufficient.  Poor  
quality  of  drinking  water  leads  to  various  diseases  and  high  death  rate.  The  ‘Point-­of-­
use’  Water  purifier  market  in  India  was  dominated  for  a  long  time  until   late  2000  by  
Aquaguard   from  Eureka  Forbes  with  a  price  between  Rs  5000   (~  US  $80)  and  Rs  
10,000  (~  US  $160),  which  was  not  affordable  to  most  Indian  families.  Efforts  were  
made   by   various   companies   to   build   affordable   water   purifiers,   e.g.   Hindustan  
Unilever’s  PureIt  water  purifier.  But  PureIt  ran  on  battery  (electricity)  and  it  cost  around  
Rs  1,800  (~  US  $  30,  battery  included).  
In  response  to  the  affordability  constraints  of  low  income  consumers,  Tata  therefore  
developed  the  “Swach”  filter  system  that  uses  silver  nano  particles  infused  in  rice  husk  
ash   (RHA),   runs   on   zero   electricity,   and   was   reportedly   claimed   as   the   world’s  
cheapest   household   water   purification   system.   RHA   reduces   the   turbidity   or  
cloudiness   of   the   water   entering   the   filter   and   removes   most   of   the   toxic   organic  
impurities,   whereas   the   silver   nanoparticles   kill   99%   of   disease   causing   bacteria.  
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Developed   by   Tata   Chemicals   with   help   from   Tata   Research,   Design   and  
Development  Centre  (TRDDC)  and  Titan  Industries,  Tata  Swach  came  in  two  variants,  
priced  at  Rs  749  (~  US  $12)  and  Rs  999  (~  US  $16),  at  a  time  when  most  other  purifiers  
cost  more  than  Rs  2,000.  
When   it   was   launched   in   December   2009,   Tata   Chemicals   had   earmarked   an  
investment  of  Rs  1  billion  (~  US  $  1.6  million)  over  five  years  for  producing,  developing  
and  launching  more  water  purifiers.  Rather    than    just  rely  on  large  scale  commercials  
and    ads,  Tata  uses  affordable  and  thereby  innovative  media  so  that  the  cost  does  not  
trickle  down  to  consumers  who  have  to  pay  for  it.  Tata  Swach  campaigns  through    an    
army    of    foot    soldiers    with    one    mission  –  education    and  demonstrations  carried  out  
house  to  house,  and  exploits  the  extensive  sales  and  distribution    network    of    other  
Tata    group    companies    such    as    Tata  Salt  (Press  Trust  of  India,  2010)  and  Rallis  
(Kinetz,  2010),  an  agrochemical  subsidiary  of  Tata  group.  It  also  uses  the  access  base  
of   its   rural   resource   centre   –   Tata   Kisan   Sansar   (Kinetz,   2010),   a   farm   services  
business   run  by  Tata  chemicals.   In  addition,   it  coordinates  with  NGOs  such  as   the  
Hawaii  children’s   foundation   to  distribute   filters   in  villages  (Tata  Chemicals  Limited,  
2011).  
No   simple   conventional   technology   exists   that   addresses   multiple   water   quality  
problems  such  as  bacterial  and  heavy  metal  contamination  together  or  Heavy  metals,  
turbidity,   pesticides   and   salinity   together   (Lakshmi   K,   et   al.,   2011).   However  
consumers   strongly   disliked   chemical   additives   (e.g.,   chlorine   tablets)   for   water  
purification,  and  preferred  filters  (Poulos,  et  al.,  2012).  Consumers  considered  filters  
to  be  superior  to  other  forms  of  treatment  because  they  are  ‘perceived’  to  treat  water  
completely,   and   when   storage   of   the   product   incorporates   a   storage   container,   it  
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protects  water  from  dust  and  hands.  Tata  Swach  Silver  Nanotechnology  provided  a  
strong  market  potential   in  providing  cost  effective  solution   to  drinking  water  quality  
problems  in  developing  countries.      
Despite  the  existence  of  a  favourable  market  and  supporting  factors  such  as  strong  
country   specificity   of   distribution   networks,   technologies   such   as   Swach,   although  
effective  and  relatively  easy  to  use,  had   its  own  adoption  challenges.  For   instance,  
though  the  filters  can  be  bought  from  grocery  stores,  purify  3,000  litres  and  last  six  
months   for   a   family   of   five,   and   cost   less   than   a   rupee   per   day   per   family,   timely  
accessibility  of  filters  would  be  a  key  determinant  in  rural  India  with  poor  transport  and  
retail  infrastructure.    However,  a  key  innovation,  the  Tata  Swach  ‘Fuse’,  indicates  the  
capacity  remaining  in  the  filter,  giving  householders  time  to  buy  a  replacement,  and  
automatically  shuts  it  off  once  the  purifying  admixture  is  exhausted.  The  fuse  is  thus  
an  important  factor  in  timely  product  accessibility.    
India’s  weak  public-­science  commercialisation  mechanisms  and  low-­cost  ‘Design  with  
Trade-­offs’  
Though  better  technology,  and  timely  accessibility  of  accessories  such  as  filters,  are  
likely  to  be  important  determinants  of  PoU  water  treatment  product  adoption  (Null,  et  
al.,   2012),   most   evidence      suggests   that   price   considerations   dominate   the   other  
elements  (Ashraf,  et  al.,  2010;;  Miguel,  et  al.,  2009).  Therefore  Tata  Swach’s  success  
is   mostly   due   to   trade-­offs   between   product   attributes   and   price   acceptable   for   a  
potentially   large   lead-­market.  Though  the  basic  product  removed  99%  bacteria  and  
many   organic   impurities,   it   is   unable   to   remove   inorganic   impurities,   particularly  
Fluoride  and  metal  ions  such  as  Arsenic.  However,  it  still  allowed  significant  gains  to  
consumer   within   their   affordability   limits   compared   to   previous   consumption   of  
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unfiltered   water.   Such   ‘design’   capabilities   could   be   a   result   of   India’s   focus   on  
developing   simpler   low-­risk   technological   solutions   in   areas   of   immediate   concern  
such   as   clean   drinking   water,   healthcare   and   energy   (Bhattacharya,   et   al.,   2012).  
Moreover,   India  has  built  a   robust   innovation  climate  around   ‘resource-­constrained’  
innovations   for   addressing   pressing   global   problems   in   clean   water   (Bhati,   2013).  
Further,   in   relation   to   nanotechnology,   India’s   present   status   of   research   and  
development   is   still   not   comparable   to   developed   countries   such   as   US,   UK   and  
Germany.   Advanced   and   more   radical   nanotechnology   innovation   requires  
institutional   complementarities   between   a   strong   ‘mission’   oriented   public-­science  
system  and  the  existence  of  a  strong  venture  finance  system  to  commercialise  high  
risk  nanotechnologies  with  a   long  gestation  period.     However,   the  weak   interaction  
between  public  science  institutions  and  firms  in  India,  compounded  by  the  lack  of  skills  
to   commercialise   scientific   output   may   have   led   to   a   focus   on   low-­cost   low   risk  
technologies   in   both   public-­science   institutions   and   firms   (Ali   &   Sinha,   2014).   In  
addition,   both  Nanotechnology   policy   and   venture   capital  mechanisms   are   in   their  
infancy.  These  factors  may  be  responsible  for  lack  of  industry  and  venture  capital  (VC)  
participation   in  more  advanced  high-­risk  nanotechnology  R&D.  Therefore   it   is   likely  
that  weak  university-­industry   links,  a  weak  venture  capital   financing  system,  and  a  
pressing  need  to  meet  basic  needs  of  people  led  to  a  focus  on  a  simpler  low-­risk  silver  
nanotechnology  based  solution   in  Tata  Swach.   It  also  makes  sense   for   industry   to  
ensure  that  low-­risk  technology  research  is  exploited,  because  commercial  successes  
of   low-­cost   solutions  could  help   catalyse  public   research   institutions  and  corporate  
R&D   units   to   subsequently   collaborate   and   innovate   around   more   advanced  




The  initial  ideas  that  led  to  the  development  of  Swach  were  infact  initiated  by  Prof.  PC  
Kapoor  at  a  public  science  institution,  ‘Indian  Institute  of  Technology  Kanpur  (IITK)’  in  
the  1980s.  After  his  retirement  he  continued  his  work  at  Tata’s  research  arm  ‘TRDDC’  
where  a  rudimentary  device  ‘Sujal’  was  developed  in  late  1990s  using  Rice  husk  ash  
(RHA)   and   pebbles.      Though  Sujal   wasn’t   commercially   successful   because   of   its  
inability   to   remove  many  bacteria,   it   provided  an   important  CSR   (Corporate  Social  
responsibility)  image  to  Tata  when  it  distributed  them  during  the  2004  Indian  Ocean  
Tsunami.  The  project  was  revived  in  2006,  and  it  took  two  years  for  the  development  
of  Swach  when  Tata  Chemicals  at  their  Innovation  centre  found  the  right  chemistry  to  
bind  silver  nano-­particles  with  significant  antibacterial  properties  to  RHA.  Interestingly  
the  Chief  Scientific  Officer  of  Tata  Chemicals  Prof.  Murali  Sastry  had  also  moved  in  
from   a   public   science   institution,   the   ‘National   Chemical   Laboratory’.   Overall   the  
development   journey  of  even  a   low-­cost  water  purification  device  points   to  a  weak  
commercialisation  mechanism  of  public  science  during  the  period.  The  initial  science  
that  had  emerged  from  a  public  science  institution  was  not  commercialised  by  it.  Tata  
independently  developed  the  ‘Swach’  purifier  by  developing  organisational  routines  for  
embedding  tacit  knowledge  brought  in  by  researchers  who  previously  worked  at  public  
science  institutions.        
Can  advanced  nano-­materials  with  high  technological  uncertainty  compete  on  low-­cost  
?    
Tata’s   competitor,   Eureka   Forbes   however   licensed   a   nanotechnology   intellectual  
property  on  a  new  ‘material’  from  another  public-­science  institution  ‘Indian  Institute  of  
Technology   Madras   (IITM)’   in   2004   in   order   to   remove   pesticides.   Though   it   had  
introduced   the   technology   in   some   of   its   products,   and   claimed   to   be   the   first  
nanotechnology  based  water  filter,  the  products  were  not  targeted  for  base  of  pyramid  
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income  groups,  because  the  production  could  not  be  scaled  to  bring  down  the  costs.  
Moreover  the  filter  was  used  as  a  retrofit  on  its  existing  products  to  additionally  remove  
pesticides.  Subsequently  IITM  created  a  spin-­off  business  ‘InnoNano  Research’  (INR)  
in  2008  to  produce  a  nanofilter  based  on  the  new  materials  it  had  been  developing  to  
capture  ions  like  arsenic,  iron  and  fluorides,  and  effectively  kill  microorganisms,  and  
also  make  affordable  water  filters  for  base  of  pyramid  that  can  tackle  complex  water  
problems.  The  main  investigator  at  IITM,  Prof.  Pradeep,  has  received  support  from  the  
governments  Department   of  Science  and  Technology   (DST)   towards  his   research.  
Moreover  the  DSTs  Nano-­mission  supported  a  ‘Thematic  unit  of  excellence  in  Water  
purification’.   However   the   commercialisation   journey   required   retaining   of   student  
researchers  trained  in  the  labs  in  order  to  drive  the  venture  activity.  Some  of  the  initial  
success  came  as  a  result  of  commissioning  by  the  districts  of  Nadia  and  Murshidabad  
in  the  Indian  state  of  West  Bengal,  to  fit  filters  to  community  water  pumps  to  remove  
arsenic.  West   Bengal   has   now   commissioned   fitting   of   2000   community   filters   for  
serving  600,000  people.           The   Indian  government  has  now  requested  all  states   to  
implement  the  filters  where  arsenic  poisoning  is  an  issue.  The  real  success  came  in  
2016  when  a  US  based  venture  capital  firm  Nanoholdings  plc  acquired  InnoNano  for  
$18mn   (Rs   1.2   bn)   and   formed   a   separate   company   headquartered   in   Singapore,  
‘Safewater  Nano  pte’,  to  globally  commercialise  its  water  purifier    that  can  effectively  
tackle  complex  water  problems  and  remove  metal  ions,  fluorides  and  bacteria  without  
requiring  any  electricity.  Nanoholdings  plc  had  also  previously  for  four  years  supported  
InnoNano’s  global  patenting  activity  before  the  acquisition.    
IITM   was   able   to   somewhat   monopolise   on   ‘new   materials’   research   for   water  
purification,   because   state   funded   research   in   India,   especially   in   ‘basic   R&D’,      is  
mostly  allocated  to  a  handful  of  elite  research  universities  and  institutes.    In  the  best  
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public  science  institutions  such  as  the  various  IIT’s  in  India,  they  not  only  recruit  the  
best  academic  staff  and  students,  but  the  academic  staff  are  likely  to  remain  in  them  
for  most   of   their   scientific   careers   because   of   their   ability   to   attract   resources   and  
funding   for   research   due   to   the   elite   status   of   their   institutions.   Interestingly,   elite  
research  institutions  such  as  the  IITs  were  created  with  on-­campus  housing  to  support  
research   staff   careers.  However,  when   public   science-­industry   links   are  weak   and  
local   venture   finance  mechanisms   are   also  weak,  mechanisms   that   are   not   highly  
competitive  in  distributing  public  funds  to  researchers  in  public  science  organisations  
may  not  encourage  research  efficiency  in  finding  novel  yet  lowest-­cost  technological  
solutions   in   the   shorter   term   for   pressing   issues   such   as   access   to   clean   water.  
According   to   Prof.   Murali   Sastry,   “issues   around   accessibility   and   distribution   of  
funding  not  only  exists  for  lab  research,  but  also  in  the  government’s  various  recent  
venture  funding  mechanisms  (including  soft-­loans)  for  scaling-­up  scientific  output.  This  
ecosystem  is  evolving  with  the  emergence  of  VC  and  Angel  Investor  firms.”            
Interestingly,  though  the  team  at  IITM  initially  received  funding  for  pilot  studies  to  test  
the   product,   lack   of   necessary   venture   finance   during   seed   stages   of  
commercialisation   and   industry   support   for   scale   up   hindered   the   speed   of  
commercialisation.  This  is  presumably  because  the  commercial  prospects  of  inventing  
completely  ‘New’  materials  are  uncertain  and  take  longer  time,  unlike  Tata’s  effort  to  
find  the  right  chemistry  to  bind  silver  nano  to  RHA  in  an  existing  rudimentary  device.  
It  took  the  team  nearly  13  years  since  the  research  efforts  started  in  2003  and  almost  
8  years  since  InnoNano  was  created  in  2008  to  receive  any  venture  backing.  Further,  
the  PoU  water  purification  market  is  very  competitive  in  India,  and  the  lack  of  uptake  
by  the  incumbent  players  may  be  due  to  both  the  technical  and  market  uncertainty  of  
‘new  materials’.  Even  for  incumbent  firms  such  as  Tata  and  Eureka  Forbes,  resolving  
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technological  uncertainty  requires  a  high  level  of  investment  over  a  long  period  of  time  
because  of  pilot  plants  and  process  innovation  required  to  meet  economies  of  scale.  
Moreover   in   a   highly   competitive   PoU   water   market,   trialability   will   require   a   full  
working  system  and  even  then  consumers  may  not  be  able  to  easily  observe  the  new  
technology   as   regards   its   universal   attributes   to   remove  metal   ions,   fluorides   and  
microorganisms.  Moreover   despite   its   universal   attributes,   targeting  many   different  
developing   country   markets   may   require   different   designs   because   of   different  
consumer   attitudes   and   design   familiarity.   Thus   given   the   long   gestation   period   of  
advanced  nanomaterials  R&D,  it  may  not  be  possible  to  deliver  the  water  purification  
system   at   low-­cost   for   consumers  without   significant   investment   and   being   patient  
about   a   long   period   for   return   on   investment.   Further,   unlike   the   case   of   the  
rudimentary  Sujal   device   that   needed  an   incremental   nanotechnology   solution  and  
where  Tata  recruited  experienced  academic  researchers,  firms  rarely  have  an  interest  
in   actively   engaging   with   academic   researchers   conducting   generic   research   with  
potentially   radical   outcomes   given   the   risks   involved.   According   to   Prof.   Pradeep,  
“though  firms  who  earlier  came  to  me  for  a  short  3  month  problem  solving  project  are  
willing  to  commit  now  for  5  years  and  also  fund  20-­30%  of  equipment  costs,  this  is  not  
true  across  the  system  and  limited  to  very  few  academics”.  However,  the  appetite  of  
firms  to  recruit  senior  researchers  from  academic  institutions  is  weak,  and  moreover  if  
they  have  to  recruit  them  even  for  incremental  solutions  such  as  in  the  case  of  Tata,  it  
indicates  a  weak  absorptive  capacity  of  firms  and  this  could  also  explain  the  lack  of  
active  engagement  with  academic  researchers  working  in  more  remote  areas.  
  
4.   Conclusions  and  Further  Research  
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China’s  ‘Diffusion  oriented’  policy  of  producing  ‘Engineers’  and  ‘Scientists’,  and  largely  
state  facilitated  and  coordinated  public  R&D,  with  weak  links  into  industry,  resulted  in  
autonomous  firms  such  as  BYD  developing  distinctive  capabilities  in  low-­cost  process  
innovation  by  exploiting  the  technological  skills  of  its  engineers  and  scientists  along  
with   support   from   key   clients   and   partners.      Even   if   public-­science   institutions   are  
engaged   with   industry,   unless   firms   make   strategic   R&D   investments   and   recruit  
leading   researchers   from  universities,  engagement   is   likely   to  be   in  solving  current  
problems  within  the  priority  sectors,  rather  than  in  ‘generic’  and  ‘pre-­competitive’  areas  
even   though   they  hold  potential   for  newer  and  higher  performance   technologies  at  
lower  cost.      
In  the  case  of  India,  a  weak  absorptive  capacity  of  firms  to  engage  with  ‘generic’  and  
‘pre-­competitive’   research  were   factors   in   internal  development  of   incremental   low-­
cost   technological   solutions  as   in   the   case  of  Tata  Swach.  Even   such   incremental  
developments   needed   recruiting   leading   scientists   from   public   science   institutions.    
Moreover  a  weak  venture  capital  system  implied  a  long  gestation  period  for  high  risk  
research  as  in  the  case  of  IITM.    However,  if  one  assumes  that  developmental  issues  
around   clean   water   necessitate   shorter   term   solutions,   it   is   questionable   whether  
distribution  of  public  funds  to  a  handful  of  elite  research  institutions  in  remote  areas,  
and  hence  a  lack  of  research  competition  can  provide  the  lowest-­cost  solutions.    
Both  the  cases  illustrate  that  the  nature  of  the  public  science  system  plays  a  critical  
role   in   firms   low-­cost   incremental   innovations.   However   though   the   public-­science  
system  may  engage  in  more  remote  and  ‘pre-­competitive’  research,  with  the  potential  
for  radical  technologies  with  better  performance  and  lower  costs,  the  current  structure  
of   institutions   does   not   encourage   their   commercial   development.   Arguably,  
institutional   changes   are   resisted   more   than   technological   changes.   One   would  
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therefore  anticipate  that   the  more  pervasive  and  radical  are  technological  changes,  
the  more  significant  will  be  changes  in  public  science  institutions  and  engagement  with  
industry,   thus  readjusting   the  entire   innovation  system  to  a  new  form  of  developing  
and  diffusing  technologies  (Lastres,  1994)  
The  existing  and  largely  market  based  understanding  of  ‘low-­cost’  innovation  does  not  
adequately  mirror  the  more  complex  reality  on  institutional  drivers.  The  results  of  this  
study  would  therefore  be  useful  to  both  policy  makers  and  firms.  For  e.g.,  in  addition  
to  firms  taking  advantage  of  market  potential  of  low-­cost  innovations  globally,  regional  
and  national  policies  should  also  support  firms  in  developing  linkages  with  the  public  
science  system.  Our  research  did  not   look  at  how  different   institutional  set-­ups  can  
lead   to  varied   types  of  capabilities  within   the  same   industry.  Future   research  could  
therefore  look  at  how  low-­cost  innovation  in  sub-­sectors  within  the  same  industry  vary  
across  different  institutions  
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